Measuring Corporate Tax Avoidance – An Analysis of Different Measures by Gebhart, Markus Sebastian
Junior Management Science 3 (2017) 43-60
Junior Management Science
journal homepage: www.jums.academy
Advisory Editorial Board:  DOMINIK VAN AAKEN FREDERIK AHLEMANN CHRISTOPH BODE ROLF BRÜHL JOACHIM BÜSCHKEN LEONHARD DOBUSCH RALF ELSAS DAVID FLORYSIAK GUNTHER FRIEDL WOLFGANG GÜTTEL CHRISTIAN HOFMANN KATJA HUTTER LUTZ JOHANNING STEPHAN KAISER ALFRED KIESER NATALIA KLIEWER DODO ZU KNYPHAUSEN-AUFSEß SABINE T. KÖSZEGI ARJAN KOZICA TOBIAS KRETSCHMER HANS-ULRICH KÜPPER REINER LEIDL ANTON MEYER GORDON MÜLLER-SEITZ GÜNTER MÜLLER-STEWENS BURKHARD PEDELL MARCEL PROKOPCZUK TANJA RABL SASCHA RAITHEL ASTRID REICHEL KATJA ROST MARKO SARSTEDT DEBORAH SCHANZ ANDREAS G. SCHERER STEFAN SCHMID UTE SCHMIEL CHRISTIAN SCHMITZ PHILIPP SCHRECK GEORG SCHREYÖGG LARS SCHWEIZER DAVID SEIDL THORSTEN SELLHORN ANDREAS SUCHANEK ORESTIS TERZIDIS ANJA TUSCHKE SABINE URNIK STEPHAN WAGNER BARBARA E. WEIßENBERGER ISABELL M. WELPE HANNES WINNER CLAUDIA B. WÖHLE THOMAS WRONA THOMAS ZWICK 
Volume 2, Issue 2, September 2017 
JUNIOR 
MANAGEMENT 
SCIENCE 
Randi Baum und Tatjana Egelhof, Die  Verwendung von Emojis in der  Konsumentenkommunikation – Eine  stimmungsanalytische Betrachtung von  Kurznachrichten im Social Web  
Markus Sebastian Gebhart, Measuring Corporate  Tax Avoidance – An Analysis of Different  Measures 
 
Raphael Uster, Der Einfluss von CEO Duality auf  die Bewertung von Schweizer  Unternehmen 
 
Maximilian Krebs, Die Einstellung  kulturinteressierter Personen gegenüber  Sponsoren kultureller Events – Eine  qualitative Studie 
  
 
    1    43    61     84                      
Published by Junior Management Science e. V.  
Measuring Corporate Tax Avoidance – An Analysis of Different Measures
Markus Sebastian Gebhart
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Abstract
This study (1) gives an overview of and analyzes the different existing measures of tax avoidance in the empirical tax research
literature and (2) aims at answering the question of how closely related they are in measuring corporate tax avoidance. Start-
ing with a theoretical comparison of different Effective Tax Rate based measures, Book-Tax-Differences based measures, the
measure developed by Henry and Sansing (2014), Tax Shelter Scores, and Unrecognized Tax Benefits an empirical comparison
of the first three mentioned measures is conducted. The purely descriptive analysis reveals that although there are differences
between the single measures and those differences persist over time, especially annual proxies exhibit considerable correla-
tion, which increases with similarity in computation and inputs used. A comparison of annual with long-run measures implies
that the reliability of annual measures in depicting long-run tax avoidance is not sufficiently high.
Keywords: tax avoidance, tax sheltering, Effective Tax Rate, Book-Tax-Difference
1. Introduction
Corporate tax avoidance has been and still is an impor-
tant issue discussed in public media and politics. The U.S.
Treasury Department Secretary, Lawrence H. Summer, char-
acterized tax avoidance in 2000 as “what may be the most
serious compliance issue threatening the American tax sys-
tem today” (U.S. Department of the Treasury (2000)). Nowa-
days, sixteen years later, data leak scandals such as the “Lux-
embourg Leaks” in 2014 (see The Guardian (2015); Houlder
(2014)) or most recently the “Panama Papers” in 2016 (see
Lipton and Creswell (2016)) still reveal massive tax avoid-
ance by corporations as well as individuals. Every year, the
loss in tax revenue in the EU due to corporate tax avoidance
is estimated from 50 to 70 billion Euros (Dover et al. (2015),
p. 16). The U.S. Treasury estimates the loss in tax revenue
due to tax sheltering (an aggressive form of tax avoidance) to
10 billion dollars annually (U.S. Department of the Treasury
(1999), p. 31). To tackle the problem of corporate tax avoid-
ance there have been actions made by supranational organi-
zations such as the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project
(BEPS) by the OECD/G20 or the Anti Tax Avoidance Package
by the EU, which try to combat corporate tax avoidance on a
global scale.1
1For information about the BEPS project see the webpages of the Organ-
isation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2016). For
Besides the social and political interest in, and the devel-
opment of, actions against corporate tax avoidance, there has
also been increasing theoretical and empirical research con-
cerning corporate tax avoidance.2 Prevalent interests of re-
search in this context are the reasons, drivers, determinants,
and implications of tax avoidance for firms and their share-
holders. One of the main challenges these empirical stud-
ies face is the measurement of corporate tax avoidance since
firms have strong incentives not to disclose their tax avoid-
ance activities (Desai and Dharmapala (2009a), p. 539; Wil-
son (2009), p. 970). Therefore, over the decades, several
different proxies for tax avoidance have been created, all of
which are argued to have different properties and face differ-
ent limitations.
Facing those numerous proxies, uncertainty may arise
about which measure to choose. To give guidance for re-
searchers in picking the right measure(s) for their research,
this bachelor thesis aims to (1) give an overview of and an-
alyze the different measures of tax avoidance existing in the
literature and (2) answer the question of how closely related
they are in measuring corporate tax avoidance. Because most
international tax research refers to the U.S., the focus in this
information on the Anti Tax Avoidance Package see the webpages of the Eu-
ropean Comission (2016).
2For an overview of the empirical tax research see Shackelford and
Shevlin (2001) and Hanlon and Heitzman (2010).
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thesis is therefore on the U.S. GAAP accounting environment.
The structure proceeds as follows: Section 2 and 3 define
the term “tax avoidance” and give guidance on the choice of
data sources used as inputs for the measures. In Section 4
the different measures are introduced and their properties
and limitations are discussed theoretically. The focus lies
thereby on Effective Tax Rate based measures, a measure of
Henry and Sansing (2014), Book-Tax-Difference measures,
Tax Shelter Scores, and the idea of Unrecognized Tax Ben-
efits. Next, Section 5 analyzes and compares the different
measures empirically. The analysis is purely descriptive in
nature and compares annual measures among one another
and furthermore examines their relationship with long-run
measures. Section 6 concludes. Overall, it is found that, al-
though the different measures of corporate tax avoidance do
exhibit differences and those differences persist over time,
measures based on the same rationale (such as Effective Tax
Rate measures) are subject to large correlation among one
another. The comparison of annual and long-run measures
shows that annual measures may not be sufficient predictors
of long-run tax avoidance.
2. Corporate Tax Avoidance
Before making attempts to measure corporate tax avoid-
ance one needs to define the term first. According to many
textbooks tax avoidance refers to the minimization of tax lia-
bility within the framework of the law, in contrast to tax eva-
sion, which refers to minimizing tax liabilities including fraud
(Miller and Oats (2014), pp. 15–16; Dover et al. (2015), p.
18).
Unfortunately, there is neither such a precise nor one sin-
gle prevalent definition of tax avoidance in the field of tax
research. This means that several different definitions of the
term are used, depending on the research question and the
means to measure avoidance. Hanlon and Heitzman, for in-
stance, define “tax avoidance broadly as the reduction of ex-
plicit taxes” (2010, p. 137). According to Chen et al. (2010)
tax avoidance or tax aggressiveness includes “tax planning
activities that are legal, or that may fall into the gray area, as
well as activities that are illegal. Thus, tax aggressive activi-
ties do not necessarily indicate that the firm has done any-
thing improper” (2010, pp. 41–42). And Tang and Firth
define “tax management, tax planning, tax avoidance, or
tax shelter as taxpayers exploiting uncertainty in tax law to
choose an advantageous method in tax reporting that influ-
ences their tax liabilities” (2011, p. 176).
As one can see, tax avoidance cannot be defined as pre-
cisely for tax research purposes as some of the textbooks
suggest. In this context Hanlon and Heitzman (Hanlon and
Heitzman (2010), p. 137) speak of a broad continuum of
actions that can be classified as tax avoidance, which ranges
from tax favored investments on one end to evasion and shel-
tering on the more aggressive end. This bachelor thesis fol-
lows the definition of Hanlon and Heitzman (2010); defining
tax avoidance very broadly reflects that the following mea-
sures do not differentiate between legal or illegal tax avoid-
ance (not even intentionally or unintentionally) and thus
measure a whole range of activities that reduce the tax bur-
den as avoidance. In the following the terms “tax avoidance”,
“tax aggressiveness”, “tax management” and “tax planning”
are all used simultaneously and “tax sheltering” is defined as
a particularly aggressive form of tax avoidance.
3. Data Sources for Measuring Corporate Tax Avoidance
For measuring corporate tax avoidance one needs infor-
mation about taxable income and tax liabilities (Salihu et al.
(2013), p. 415) as well as financial statement data. The lat-
ter one is readily available (at least for publicly traded firms),
while the two former ones are less available. Potential infor-
mation sources for the required inputs are either financial
statements of the company or its tax returns. While tax re-
turns should contain the most accurate inputs of taxable in-
come and tax liabilities, access to such information is limited
since tax returns are confidential and thus can only be used
by a few people (Salihu et al. (2013), p. 415). Alternatively,
taxable income and tax liabilities can be estimated from fi-
nancial statements by grossing-up the current tax expense
(as developed by Manzon Jr and Plesko (2002), p. 188). To
estimate taxable income, current tax expense is therefore di-
vided by the statutory tax rate3:
taxable income =
cur rent tax ex pense
statutor y tax rate
(1)
(Manzon Jr and Plesko (2002), p. 188)
However, this could lead to a poor estimate of the ac-
tual taxable income. As Hanlon’s answer to the title of her
paper “What Can We Infer about a Firm’s Taxable Income
from Its Financial Statements?” “The short answer: Usually
not much” (Hanlon (2003), p. 831) suggests, there are sev-
eral problems with estimating taxable income from financial
statement data. She identifies three main reasons, why sim-
ply grossing-up current tax expense may lead to wrong esti-
mates: (1) Current tax expense is likely to be over- or under-
stated in comparison to the actual tax liability.4 (2) Grossing-
up using the top statutory tax rate will lead to wrong esti-
mates of worldwide taxable income for multinational corpo-
rations doing business in several countries and therefore fac-
ing different tax rates. (3) In case of tax losses, current tax
expense will usually be truncated at zero (Hanlon (2003)).
3Note that the statutory tax rate is assumed to be the top federal corporate
income tax rate for the U.S. of 35 percent (see KPMG (2016); PWC (2016)),
which is widely used in the tax research literature (Hanlon (2003), p. 844).
4According to Hanlon, the main reasons for an overstated current tax ex-
pense are the differential treatment of nonqualified employee stock options
in financial accounting and tax accounting and the “tax cushion” which is in-
corporated into the current tax expense. Further, current tax expense could
be understated because it only captures taxes on continuing operations but
not on discontinued operations and extraordinary expenses (benefits), and
thus does not reflect the tax on all types of earnings (Hanlon (2003), pp.
838–843). For the effect of employee stock options on the current tax ex-
pense see also Hanlon and Shevlin (2002).
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However, since tax returns can only be accessed by a
few people, and additional disclosures would be necessary
to develop a better measure of taxable income, estimating
it by grossing-up is a widely used practice (Hanlon (2003),
p. 832, 843). Nonetheless one needs to keep these limita-
tions in mind when using such estimates as inputs in mea-
sures of corporate tax avoidance. Especially measures based
on Book-Tax-Differences may suffer from incorrect estimates
as described below.
4. Measures of Corporate Tax Avoidance
In the tax research literature several different measures
of tax avoidance have been developed and used. These mea-
sures differ with respect to the underlying rationale of mea-
suring tax avoidance.
The purpose of this section is to give an overview of the
proposed measures in the literature as well as analyze them
in terms of validity and performance as measures of corpo-
rate tax avoidance.
4.1. Effective Tax Rate Based Measures
The first approach relies on the Effective Tax Rate (ETR).
The Effective Tax Rate is basically the average tax rate a cor-
poration pays on its pre-tax profits and is calculated by divid-
ing a measure of tax liability by a measure of pre-tax income
(Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), p. 139; Gupta and Newberry
(1997), p. 1).
ETR =
measure o f tax l iabil i t y
measure o f pre− tax income (2)
ETR based measures can be compared with the statutory
tax rate. If an ETR measure is below the statutory tax rate,
this could signal tax avoidance.
The ETR can be calculated based on different measures of
tax liability (total tax expense, current tax expense, cash tax
expense)5 and pre-tax income, and can vary in terms of pe-
riods included in the measure. Broadly, one can differentiate
between annual ETR measures and long-run ETR measures.
4.1.1. Annual ETR Measures
GAAP ETR
The basic form of annual ETR measures is the annual
GAAP Effective Tax Rate (GAAP ETR), which is disclosed by
firms in their financial statements (Dyreng et al. (2008), p.
65). It is defined as:
GAAP ETR =
total tax ex pense
pre− tax income (3)
5 To guarantee consistency with the empirical part of this thesis the def-
initions for these items are in line with those provided by the Compustat
database. Therefore, total tax expense includes all income taxes imposed on
the firm, current tax expense represents the current amount of taxes payable
by the firm and cash taxes paid is the sum of all income taxes actually paid
by the firm (Wharton Research Data Services (2016b)).
(Dyreng et al. (2008), p. 65; Chen et al. (2010), p. 46;
Dyreng et al. (2010), pp. 1168–1170)6
This basic form of ETR suffers from several severe limi-
tations. Dyreng et al. (Dyreng et al. (2008), p. 65) criticize
the GAAP ETR for not measuring tax deferral strategies (so
do Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), p. 139 and Salihu et al.
(2013), p. 416). They argue since total tax expense incorpo-
rates both current and deferred tax expense, but tax deferral
strategies will reduce current tax expense and simultaneously
increase deferred tax expense, these tax planning activities
will not have any influence on GAAP ETR. Furthermore, the
reliance on pre-tax income in the denominator limits GAAP
ETR to non-conforming tax avoidance7 (Badertscher et al.
(2015), p. 6; Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), pp. 139–140;
Salihu et al. (2013), p. 416). Thus, GAAP ETR would, for
instance, not capture the tax effects of interest deductibility,
because this reduces both taxable and financial income (Han-
lon and Heitzman (2010), p. 141). Due to these limitations
it becomes clear, that the GAAP ETR does not measure a con-
siderable portion of tax avoidance.
Moreover, GAAP ETR does not distinguish between re-
ductions in tax liabilities due to actual tax planning strategies
and other “accidental” reductions (e.g. changes in valuation
allowances) not associated with tax considerations. In fact
every reduction of the explicit tax liability will alter GAAP
ETR (Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), pp. 139–141).
Furthermore, the high volatility in GAAP ETR due to the
use of annual data (Dyreng et al. (2008), p. 65) makes long-
term predictions difficult. There is also a significant trunca-
tion bias of GAAP ETR rates (Henry and Sansing (2014)).
This truncation bias results when pre-tax income is negative,
in which case researchers usually drop loss years (Henry and
Sansing (2014), p. 2; Wilkie and Limberg (1993), p. 49)
since the interpretation of negative ETR is difficult. Accord-
ing to Henry and Sansing (Henry and Sansing (2014), p. 3)
this practice also leads to an asymmetrical treatment of in-
come and loss years, which may distort the results. Because
of these shortcomings, there have been attempts to modify
the GAAP ETR in order to increase the power of Effective Tax
Rate measures.
Current ETR
To overcome the limitation of the GAAP ETR only measur-
ing permanent tax avoidance, one could use current tax ex-
pense in the numerator instead which yields the Current Ef-
fective Tax Rate (Current ETR) measure (Salihu et al. (2013),
p. 416):
Current ETR =
cur rent tax ex pense
pre− tax income (4)
6The annual GAAP ETR is used, for instance, in studies by Chen et al.
(2010), Dyreng et al. (2010), Armstrong et al. (2012), or .
7Non-conforming tax avoidance refers to tax planning strategies that re-
sult in a decrease in taxable income, while leaving financial income unaf-
fected. Conforming tax avoidance reduces both taxable and financial income
(Badertscher et al. (2015), p. 1).
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(Salihu et al. (2013), p. 416)8
This variation allows measurement of tax deferral strate-
gies (Salihu et al. (2013), pp. 416–417), because a reduc-
tion in current tax expense will not get compensated by an
increase in the deferred tax expense, as this was the case
using total tax expense (as described above). However, be-
sides the enhancement in measuring tax deferral strategies,
the Current ETR measure suffers from the same problems as
the GAAP ETR. Additionally, as already described in Section
3 current tax expense may be over- or understated in com-
parison to the actual tax expense (Hanlon (2003), p. 831),
which may distort the Current ETR.
Cash ETR
A further variation of annual ETR is the Cash Effective
Tax Rate (Cash ETR), defined as:
Cash ETR =
cash taxes paid
pre− tax income (5)
(Chen et al. (2010), p. 46; Dyreng et al. (2010), p. 1169)9
Using cash taxes paid in the numerator instead of total or
current tax expense makes the measure robust to changes
in estimates as, for example, in the valuation allowances
(Dyreng et al. (2008), p. 66). It also takes into account the
tax effects of employee stock options (Dyreng et al. (2008),
p. 66; Chen et al. (2010), p. 48), one main factor identified
by Hanlon (2003) resulting in an overstatement of current
tax expense, and thus is not subject to overstatement in this
matter.
On the other hand, cash taxes paid could also include tax
payments of former periods as it includes all taxes paid in one
year regardless of which periods they actually arose in (e.g.
tax payment related to an IRS audit of former years), which
could lead to a mismatch of numerator and denominator and
thus distort the Cash ETR (Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), p.
139; Dyreng et al. (2008), pp. 66–67). As in the case of Cur-
rent ETR, Cash ETR also suffers from the remaining problems
of GAAP ETR, not fixed by using cash taxes paid.
Cash flow based ETRs Another though less frequently used al-
ternative to GAAP ETR (using pre-tax income) is the applica-
tion of operating cash flows in the denominator. This yields
measures such as total tax expense over operating cash flow
(further called CFM1) (as used in Zimmerman (1983); Sal-
ihu et al. (2013)) or cash taxes paid over operating cash flow
(further called CFM2) (as used in Salihu et al. (2013))
C F M1 =
total tax ex pense
operating cash f low
(6)
(Zimmerman (1983), pp. 122–123; Salihu et al. (2013), p.
417)
C F M2 =
cash taxes paid
operating cash f low
(7)
8This measure is used as a proxy for tax avoidance in Hope et al. (2013),
or Lennox et al. (2013).
9The Cash ETR is, for instance, applied in studies from Chen et al. (2010),
Dyreng et al. (2010) and Lennox et al. (2013).
(Salihu et al. (2013), p. 418)
Although C F M1 is not impacted by accrual accounting in
the denominator, it still is subject to accrual effects in the nu-
merator by using total tax expense and thus only measures
non-conforming tax avoidance (Salihu et al. (2013), p. 417).
C F M2 solves this problem by using cash taxes paid. There-
fore, it is argued that cash taxes paid over operating cash flow
is able to measure conforming tax avoidance (Salihu et al.
(2013), p. 418). The remaining problems associated with
the total/cash tax expense are also applicable to the C F M1
and C F M2.
4.1.2. Long-Run ETR Measure
To overcome some of the previously discussed limitations
of the annual ETR measures, Dyreng et al. (2008) develop
a measure called Long-run Cash Effective Tax Rate (Long-
Run Cash ETR / lr. Cash ETR). They define their measure as
the sum of cash taxes paid over a long period of time (e.g.
ten years) divided by the sum of pre-tax income (excluding
special items) over the same time period:
Long − Run Cash ETR =∑N
t=1 cash taxes paidt∑N
t=1 (pre− tax incomet − special i temst)
(8)
(Dyreng et al. (2008), p. 67)10
This enables them to (1) use and benefit from cash taxes
paid in the numerator, without suffering from a potential mis-
match of periods11 (Dyreng et al. (2008), pp. 66–67), (2)
measure corporate tax avoidance over a long period of time,
reducing volatility present in annual ETR measures (Hanlon
and Heitzman (2010), p. 141; Salihu et al. (2013), p. 417),
and (3) reduce (though not eliminate) data truncation bias
due to loss years (Henry and Sansing (2014), p. 4).
Although Long-Run Cash ETR solves many problems asso-
ciated with annual ETR measures, it still suffers certain limi-
tations: It is still limited to non-conforming tax avoidance,
measures all influences on explicit tax liabilities and does
not differentiate between aggressive and non-aggressive tax
avoidance (Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), p. 141). Although
reduced, there is still the risk of a truncation bias due to the
elimination of loss firms (Henry and Sansing (2014), p. 4).
4.2. Henry and Sansing’s HS Measure
Henry and Sansing (Henry and Sansing (2014), pp.
9–14) develop a measure (further referred to as HS) based
10Long-Run Cash ETR has been widely used in tax research literature as
a proxy for corporate tax avoidance as in Chen et al. (2010), Dyreng et al.
(2010), Armstrong et al. (2012), Hope et al. (2013), Lennox et al. (2013),
and Lisowsky (2010).
11Summing up cash taxes paid reduces the risk that a large portion of the
numerator refers to a time period not captured in the denominator (Dyreng
et al. (2008), p. 67).
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on the Cash ETR which does not suffer a truncation bias.12
They argue that the omission of loss firms leads to a sub-
stantial truncation bias for annual Cash ETR as well as for
Long-Run Cash ETR.13
To avoid the omission of loss firms, they decompose the
Cash ETR components. Cash taxes paid can be viewed as the
combination of the expected amount of tax payments based
on the pre-tax income times the statutory tax rate τ (the hy-
pothetical case of a firm with no book-tax differences facing
only one tax rate) and a combination of tax preferences, ∆.
Those preferences explain the differences between the hypo-
thetical case and the actual tax payments (Henry and Sansing
(2014), p. 9):
cash taxes paid = τ ∗ (pre− tax income) +∆ (9)
This can be solved for ∆, yielding the tax preferences of
a firm:
∆= cash taxes paid −τ ∗ (pre− tax income) (10)
Henry and Sansing (2014) argue that pre-tax income
equals size (Market Value of Assets, MVA) times accounting
profitability (Return on Assets, ROA):
pre− tax income = MVA∗ ROA (11)
In their view, using pre-tax income may lead to biased
results, since ETR measures therefore are also driven by the
pre-tax profitability (see decomposition of pre-tax income in
eq. 10) and not solely due to differences in tax preferences.
They propose to use Market Value of Assets (MVA) in the de-
nominator to account for this problem, whereby MVA is de-
fined as:
MVA= book value o f assets + (markt value o f equi t y
−book value o f equi t y) = BVA+ (MV E − BV E)
(12)
(Henry and Sansing (2014), p. 10)
They measure corporate tax avoidance as the tax prefer-
ences, ∆, scaled by size (MVA):
HS =
∆
MVA
=
cash taxes paid −τ ∗ (pre− tax income)
MVA
(13)
12This relatively young measure finds application as a proxy of tax avoid-
ance in papers by Bonsall et al. (2015), Cen et al. (2016) and Koester et al.
(2016).
13For instance, Dyreng et al. (2008) drop 18 percent of the one year and
15 percent of the ten year observations in their study of “Long-Run Corporate
Tax Avoidance”.
A firm without tax preferences (∆= 0, i.e. cash taxes paid
= expected tax payment) will have a Cash ETR equal to the
statutory rate and an HS of zero. If the tax preferences are
positive (∆> 0, i.e. cash taxes paid > the expected tax pay-
ment), Cash ETR will be higher than the statutory rate and
the HS will be positive. In the case of negative tax prefer-
ences (∆< 0, i.e. cash taxes paid < statutory tax rate), Cash
ETR will be lower than the statutory tax rate and HS will be
negative.
The HS measure solves two problems associated with ETR
measures: First, it eliminates the risk of data truncation bias,
because MVA will always be positive and no observations
need to be dropped (Henry and Sansing (2014), p. 11). Fur-
thermore, as already mentioned, HS is not driven by the pre-
tax profitability of the firm (Henry and Sansing (2014), p.
10), which may distort ETR measures. Additionally, using
MVA in the denominator should enable measuring conform-
ing and non-conforming tax avoidance (Badertscher et al.
(2015), p. 3). It is also possible to measure long-run tax
avoidance using the HS measure (Henry and Sansing (2014),
pp. 15–16). On the other hand, the HS measure lacks the
intuitive interpretation of ETR measures, which makes inter-
pretation more complicated (Bonsall et al. (2015, p. 13)).
4.3. Book-Tax-Differences Based Measures
The third approach uses differences between the financial
income and taxable income, or Book-Tax-Differences (BTD).
The BTD is usually defined as the difference between pre-
tax income according to the financial statement (also called
“book income”) and the taxable income according to the tax
return (Manzon Jr and Plesko (2002), p. 192; Guenther
(2014), p. 7). Because of the confidentiality of tax return
data, taxable income is estimated based on current tax ex-
pense as described above. This yields the basic formula for
the Total BTD developed by Manzon Jr and Plesko (2002):
Total BT D = pre− tax income− cur rent tax ex pense
statutor y tax rate
(14)
(Manzon Jr and Plesko (2002), p. 192; Guenther (2014), p.
7)14
Prior research suggests that BTD are partly attributable
to corporate tax avoidance. Desai (2003) argues that the in-
crease in BTD during the 1990s is to some extent due to an
increase in tax sheltering activity. Wilson (2009) also finds
a significant effect of tax sheltering on BTD and so do Tang
and Firth (2011). On the other hand, BTD are also associated
with earnings management15 (see Tang and Firth (2011) and
Hanlon (2005)). Earnings management could influence the
14The Total BTD is used in papers by Wilson (2009), Chen et al. (2010),
Lisowsky (2010), Lennox et al. (2013), and Desai and Dharmapala (2009a).
15Earnings management refers to actions managers take using their own
judgement in financial reporting to influence financial outcomes (Healy and
Wahlen (1999), p. 368) and thus may have an influence on BTD.
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BTD in cases when managers try to inflate financial earnings,
which would all else equal lead to an increase in the BTD.
Therefore, measures based on Total BTD have been devel-
oped to account for the influence of earnings management.
4.3.1. Discretionary Total BTD
Based on the basic formula of the Total BTD developed by
Manzon Jr and Plesko (2002), Desai and Dharmapala (De-
sai (2003), pp. 158–160) create a measure of corporate tax
avoidance called Discretionary Total BTD (Lee et al. (2015),
p. 27) or Abnormal BTD (Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), p.
141). To avoid BTD being driven by earnings management,
they regress the Total BTD (eq. 13) scaled by lagged total as-
sets16 on total accruals (scaled by lagged total assets) which
they argue reflect earnings management attempts:
BT Dt
lag ged total assetst
= β0+β1∗ TAtlag ged total assetst +εt
(15)
(Desai and Dharmapala (2006), p. 159)17
The residual εt + β0 is interpreted as the portion of BTD
not associated with earnings management and, thus, can be
used as a proxy for tax avoidance in year θ :
Discret ionar y Total BT Dt = εt + β0 (16)
(Desai and Dharmapala (2006), p. 159)
Although Discretionary Total BTD controls for earnings
management it might be biased due to the estimation of tax-
able income as discussed in Section 3. However, Desai and
Dharmapala argue that at least the problem associated with
nonqualified employee stock options will not impact their
measure (2006, pp. 158–159). Because the measure con-
sists of residuals, it sums up to zero over all firms and years
and therefore can neither be interpreted as a dollar amount
nor can it be used to calculate economy wide tax avoidance
over all firms (Desai and Dharmapala (2006), p. 160). This
also aggravates the interpretation of the Discretionary To-
tal BTD, since it cannot be interpreted as easily as the ETR
based measures. Per definition, Discretionary Total BTD is
limited to non-conforming tax avoidance (Hanlon and Heitz-
man (2010), p. 141). Additionally, the Discretionary Total
BTD does also not distinguish between actions that intention-
ally create Book-Tax-Differences and actions that accidentally
create such differences (except for earnings management)
(Frank et al. (2009), p. 472).
16 The BTD is scaled by lagged total assets in order to control for firm scale
(Desai and Dharmapala (2006), p. 158; Desai and Dharmapala (2009a),
p. 540)), because the same BTD might be high for a relatively small firm
and small for a relatively large firm (Guenther (2014), p. 7). This scaling
makes BTD comparable between firms. They use the Ordinary Least Squares
Method (OLS) for their regression.
17This measure is used for instance in studies from Desai and Dharmapala
(2009b), and Chen et al. (2010).
4.3.2. Discretionary Permanent BTD
To address the problem of Book-Tax-Differences not asso-
ciated with tax planning, Frank et al. (Frank et al. (2009),
pp. 472–474) develop their own measure, called Discre-
tionary Permanent BTD. The measure only captures perma-
nent Book-Tax-Differences following the argument that ideal
tax shelter activities result in permanent differences between
financial and taxable income and temporary BTD are also in-
fluenced by earnings management. They use Total Perma-
nent BTD, defined as:
Total Permanent BT D =
Total BT D− de f er red tax ex pense
statutor y tax rate
(17)
(Frank et al. (2009), p. 473)
The Total Permanent BTD can also be computed using
an ETR differential, i.e. the difference between statutory tax
rate and GAAP ETR multiplied by pre-tax income (Lee et al.
(2015), p. 27).
This Total Permanent BTD is regressed on a set of control
variables, which are known to create permanent Book-Tax-
Differences but are not associated with tax planning, in order
to make their measure robust against “accidental” BTD. Their
measure is as follows:
Total Permanent BT Dt = βX + εt (18)
(Frank et al. (2009), p. 473)
Where X is a m × n matrix of control variables (with m
observations for each firm and n control variables)18, and β is
the corresponding 1×n vector of coefficients. The error term
εt is the Discretionary Permanent BTD (or DTAX); i.e. the
portion of Total Permanent BTD that is driven by tax planning
activities:
Discret ionar y Permanent BT Dt = DTAX t = εt (19)
(Frank et al. (2009), p. 473)19
By construction, the Discretionary Permanent BTD ex-
cludes Temporary BTD, which has led to criticism by Hanlon
and Heitzman (Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), p. 142). They
argue that tax avoidance creates Permanent and Temporary
BTD and thus the measure developed by Frank et al. (2009)
may fail to measure a significant proportion of tax avoidance
(such as tax deferral strategies). On the other hand, Frank
et al. (Frank et al. (2009), p. 472) reason that the benefits
18 The control variables are: goodwill and other intangibles, income (loss)
reported under the equity method, income (loss) attributable to minority
interest, current state income tax expense, change in net operating loss carry
forwards, and one-year lagged Total Permanent BTD (Frank et al. (2009),
p. 473)
19 The Discretionary Permanent BTD is, for instance, used in studies from,
Lisowsky (2010), Tang and Firth (2011), and Lennox et al. (2013).
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of excluding temporary differences is worth the costs of not
measuring temporary tax avoidance. In their view, control-
ling for earnings management justifies this limitation. How-
ever, one could argue that it depends on the research ques-
tion and targets to decide about the usefulness of the Discre-
tionary Permanent BTD. Similarly to the Total BTD and Dis-
cretionary Total BTD, the Discretionary Permanent BTD only
captures non-conforming tax avoidance (Hanlon and Heitz-
man (2010), p. 142).
4.4. Tax Shelter Scores
Besides ETR and BTD based measures, there have been
attempts to measure the likelihood of tax shelter activities
(considered to be one of the most aggressive form of tax
avoidance; Lisowsky et al. (2013), pp. 590–591; Hanlon and
Heitzman (2010), p. 137) based on certain firm characteris-
tics.
Based on a sample of firms being accused of tax shelter-
ing, Wilson (Wilson (2009), pp. 979– 984) uses a logis-
tic regression model to regress the probability that a firm
is identified as being engaged in tax sheltering (defined as
ln( PShel ter1−PShel ter )) on certain firm
ln(
PShel ter
1− PShel ter ) = βX + εt (20)
(Wilson (2009), p. 982)
Where X is the m× n matrix of firm characteristics (with
m observations and n control variables)20 and β the corre-
sponding 1× n vector of coefficients. He finds that BTD (To-
tal, Permanent, and Temporary), leverage, and discretionary
accruals (measure of earnings management) are significantly
associated with tax sheltering. For instance, a one percent in-
crease in Total BTD results in a 2.78 percent increase in the
probability of tax sheltering and a one percent increase in dis-
cretionary accruals results in a 3.45 percent increase in the
probability of tax sheltering (Wilson (2009), p. 986).
Lisowsky (2010) extends the framework of Wilson (2009)
using a larger sample of firms and more firm characteristics.21
Overall, his model has a 88 percent chance of identifying a
tax shelter firm as one with a higher predicted probability of
tax shelter likelihood (Lisowsky (2010), p. 1718).
Using the results of Wilson (2009) or Lisowsky (2010)
one could estimate the likelihood of tax sheltering for the
firm of interest and thus create a proxy for tax avoidance.
While this approach may be a useful approximation for tax
avoidance behavior, the results should be used with caution.
20The firm characteristics used by Wilson (Wilson (2009), pp. 982–986)
are Total BTD, Temporary BTD (defined as deferred tax expense grossed up
by statutory tax rate), Permanent BTD (defined as Total BTD minus Tempo-
rary BTD), discretionary accruals, log of total assets, leverage ratio, foreign
income, research and development scaled by total assets, and return on as-
sets. These characteristics are associated with increased opportunities for
tax sheltering.
21The variables involve those used in Wilson (2009) and add several
new variables. For descriptions of those variables, see Lisowsky (Lisowsky
(2010), p. 1704).
Because the sample of firms used only contains firms being
accused of tax sheltering it may not be possible to generalize
those results for the whole population of firms. Corporations
usually use many different practices to reduce their tax bur-
den and only firms that either have already exploited all other
techniques or are not able to exploit other techniques would
rely on tax shelters. Thus the sample is likely to reflect only
extreme cases of tax avoidance (Lee et al. (2015), pp. 29–30;
Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), pp. 143–144). Furthermore,
firms may be able to engage in tax sheltering without getting
caught by the tax authorities. These firms, however, are not
included in the sample (Lee et al. (2015), p. 30), making the
generalization of the results questionable.
4.5. Unrecognized Tax Benefits
Another way to get a proxy for corporate tax avoidance is
the usage of Unrecognized Tax Benefits reported in financial
statements.22 For fiscal years after December 15, 2006 all
publicly traded U.S. firms are required to disclose so-called
"Unrecognized Tax Benefits" in their financial statements ac-
cording to Financial Accounting Standards Board Interpreta-
tion No. 48 (FIN 48) (Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) (2006), p. 7). Under this FIN 48 environment, there
is a two-step process of evaluating uncertain tax positions
(see Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) (2006),
pp. 1–7). First, a firm recognizes all tax positions for which
it is more likely than not (i.e. with a probability > 50 per-
cent) that the tax authorities will challenge those positions.
Second, the identified tax positions should be valued at “the
largest amount of tax benefit that is greater than 50 percent
likely of being realized upon ultimate settlement with a tax-
ing authority that has full knowledge of all relevant informa-
tion” (Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) (2006),
p. 3). As a result of this two- step process, there may be
differences between the benefit recognized in the financial
statement and the tax return. These differences are labeled
Unrecognized Tax Benefits (UTB) and they are reflected by a
contingent liability in the financial statements.
The rationale behind the argument that these UTB reflect
corporate tax avoidance is that firms which are taking a more
tax aggressive approach will have higher uncertainty in their
tax positions and thus higher UTB compared to firms taking a
more conservative approach (Lisowsky et al. (2013), p. 590).
Therefore one can infer the degree of tax avoidance a firm
is involved in from the UTB. To make the UTB comparable
across firms it can be scaled by total assets (Lisowsky et al.
(2013), p. 599).
Lisowsky et al. (2013) find a significant, positive rela-
tionship between tax shelter use and UTB. They also show
that the results of Lisowsky (2010) (see Section 4.4) im-
prove in quality when UTB is included. Furthermore, they
find that the relationship between UTB and tax avoidance is
not driven by earnings management, which could present a
22Unrecognized tax benefits are discussed in studies from Lisowsky et al.
(2013), Waegenaere et al. (2015), and Lee et al. (2015).
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severe shortcoming of UTB as argued in Hanlon & Heitzman
(Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), p. 143).
5. Empirical Analysis of Corporate Tax Avoidance Mea-
sures
The previously discussed measures of corporate tax
avoidance are based on similar inputs. The variations of
ETR and BTD measures especially are quite similar in com-
putation. This leads to the question: How closely related
are these measures among one another in measuring tax
avoidance?
This question has already been discussed by other re-
searchers. Lisowsky et al. (Lisowsky et al. (2013), pp.
589–592) argue that different measures capture different
degrees of the "continuum" tax avoidance (see Section 2).
They place measures such as GAAP ETR and Cash ETR on
the less aggressive side of the continuum, and Total BTD,
Discretionary Total BTD, Discretionary Permanent BTD and
UBT on the more aggressive end of the range. Hanlon &
Heitzman on the other hand find BTD based measures to be
“closely related” (2010, p. 141) to ETR measures. Guenther
(2014) goes even so far as to claim that BTD do not con-
tain any different information compared to ETR measures
besides adding measurement error. He shows that BTD (and
also the HS) measures are basically just transformations of
ETR measures.
To get a better understanding of the relationship between
the different measures they will be compared empirically. In
a first step the distributional characteristics and development
of annual measures over time are analyzed (for the time pe-
riod of 1996-2015) in order to examine if there are differ-
ences and similarities. Second, it will be investigated how
good annual measures are at predicting long-term tax avoid-
ance (for the time period of 2006-2015).
In the following, the focus will be on ETR, BTD, and the
HS measures of tax avoidance because necessary informa-
tion for computing tax shelter scores are not publicly avail-
able. Further, since UTB are only available for fiscal years
after December 15, 2006, but the observation period will be
from 1996-2015, UTB will not be part of the investigation be-
cause for a substantial part of the observations no UTB data
will be available.
5.1. Sample Selection
The data retrieved covers all the available publicly traded
companies from the Compustat Database for the years 1996
to 2015 for the first analysis and 2006-2015 for the com-
parison of annual and long-run measures. Reducing the ob-
servation period for the long-run comparison is necessary
to maximize the sample since the fraction of firms having
non-missing data for more than ten consecutive years is very
small. For the first analysis, however, it is not important to
have data over such a long time horizon without missing val-
ues. Thus, in order to maximize the sample, the observation
period will cover twenty years of data.
The data items retrieved from the Compustat Database
are summarized in Appendix 1. Requirements for the data in
the first sample (Sample 1) are that there is no missing data
for the items “total assets” (# 6 AT)23, “total liabilities” (#
181 LT), “market value of equity” (# - MKVALT), “pre-tax in-
come” (# 170 PI), “operating cash flow” (# 308 OANCF), “to-
tal tax expense” (# 16 TXT), “current tax expense” (# - TXC),
“deferred tax expense” (# 50 TXDI), “cash taxes paid” (# 317
TXPD), or “net income” (# 172 NI). These restrictions are
necessary to ensure that it is technically possible to compute
the different measures of tax avoidance. In order to avoid
the problem of firms facing several different tax rates which
creates problems when estimating taxable income, only firms
without foreign income are included in the sample (follow-
ing Dyreng et al. (2008), p. 67). Further, certain items used
for the computation of BTD are set equal to zero if they are
missing. These items are “intangible assets – total” (# 33
INTAN), “Income (loss) reported under the equity method”
(# 55 ESUB), “minority interest” (# 49 MII), “income taxes
state” (# 173 TXS), and “tax loss carry forward” (# 52 TLCF).
This is done based on the assumption that missing values in
these categories indicate that they were zero for the observa-
tion period. Total accruals needed for the Discretionary Total
BTD are calculated by subtracting “operating cash flow" from
“net income” (# 172 NI) (Penman (2013), p. 123, 125), and
are set equal to zero if missing.
For the second analysis (Sample 2), firms are additionally
required to have ten years of non-missing data for the years
2006 to 2015. The five-year measures are computed for the
time period 2006 – 2010 and 2011 – 2015, the ten-year mea-
sures for the time period 2006 – 2015.
The ETR measures are computed according to the formu-
las above. Because negative ETRs are difficult to interpret
they are excluded from the analysis if either the numerator
is negative or the denominator is less or equal to zero. Fur-
ther, ETR measures above one and below zero are excluded
to improve interpretation.
The HS measure is calculated according to the formu-
las above. In order to control for outliers the smallest and
biggest percentage of observations is excluded from the anal-
ysis.24
The BTD measures are regressed with two modifications.
The Total BTD is scaled by the one year lagged value of to-
tal assets in order to make the measure comparable across
firms (following Desai and Dharmapala (2009a), p. 540;
Lisowsky (2010), p. 1704). For the computation of the Dis-
cretionary Permanent BTD all variables are scaled by the one-
year lagged value of total assets in order to achieve the same
goal. Values for BTD are computed unless a firm has only
data existing for one year, which makes a linear regression
23The brackets display the Legacy CST Item Number (retrieved from the
Center for Research in Security Prices (2016)) and the mnemonic abbrevi-
ation of the Compustat Database (retrieved from Wharton Research Data
Services (2016a)) of the data items.
24For the effects outliers might have on the results see Toutenburg,
Heumann, and Schomaker (Toutenburg et al. (2009), p. 187); Wooldridge
(Wooldridge (2013), pp. 316–324).
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Table 1: Distributional Characteristics of Annual Measures
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
GAAP ETR 20,003 0.3009 0.1582 0 0.9989
Current ETR 19,793 0.2365 0.1874 0 1
Cash ETR 19,848 0.2124 0.1900 0 1
CFM1 20,400 0.2358 0.2117 0 1
CFM2 22,597 0.1682 0.2021 0 1
HS 36,018 0.0281 0.0677 -0.0630 0.4994
Total BTD 19,795 0.0324 0.0849 -0.1332 0.8587
Discretionary Total BTD 18,079 0.0232 0.0657 -0.1937 0.4227
Discretionary Permanent BTD 19,223 0.0071 0.0439 -0.1358 0.4445
impossible. Loss years are omitted from the sample (i.e. in
cases where pre-tax income or current tax expense< 0) since
the BTD is likely to be erroneous because the estimation of
taxable income is likely to result in meaningless results. To
control for outliers the smallest and biggest percentage of ob-
servations is excluded from further analysis.
At this point it should be mentioned that these data re-
quirements can lead to biased results, since a substantial frac-
tion of observations is omitted. However, the requirements
are necessary in order to be able to compute the measures
and interpret them properly. A summary of the impact of
the data requirements is given in Appendix 2. Overall, only
approximately 50 percent of the observations are usable for
ETR and BTD measures in the first sample. In contrast, the
HS measure enables the use of 91.40 percent of the obser-
vations (in Sample 1). As already described, this is due to
the use of MVA as the numerator instead of pre-tax income,
which is always positive (see Section 4.2 for a detailed argu-
mentation).
Also note that the high fraction of used observations for
Discretionary Total BTD (0.9801) is only due to the fact that
this kind of BTD can solely be computed if the Total BTD is
available. Therefore a substantial amount of observations is
already lost due to technical reasons (i.e. all observations for
which Total BTD is not usable; this includes all observations
with pre-tax income or current tax expense below zero). In-
terestingly, the fraction of usable observations is higher for
the second sample. On the other hand, increasing the ob-
servation period from one to up to ten years (for long-run
measures) reduces the possible truncation bias just slightly.
5.2. Comparison of Annual Measures
In a first step of the analysis the annual measures are com-
pared to show differences and similarities between them for
the observation period and over time.
5.2.1. Distributional Characteristics
Table 1 gives an overview of the main summary statistics
of the measures.25
25Those are the arithmetic mean (Mean), standard deviation (Std. Dev.)
and the minimal (Min.) and maximal (Max.) values. Please note that the
values in all tables are rounded to four decimal places.
The data reveals that the GAAP ETR has the highest mean
of all ETR based measures (0.3009) followed by Current ETR
(0.2365), C F M1 (0.2358), Cash ETR (0.2124), and C F M2
(0.1682). GAAP ETR, having the highest mean, is consistent
with the theoretical argumentation that it only captures non-
conforming tax avoidance and ignores tax deferral strategies.
Therefore, it is consistent for Current ETR to be lower since
it reflects tax deferral strategies. One could argue that Cash
ETR should lie below Current ETR because cash taxes paid
is not subject to overstatement to the same extent as current
tax expense is. This argument is supported by Cash ETR hav-
ing a lower mean than Current ETR. Finally C F M2, having
the lowest mean, is in line with it being the only measure
also capturing conforming tax avoidance. The interpretation
of C F M1 is in some way hard, since it should be less but still
vulnerable to accrual accounting making an interpretation
of the result difficult. The mean of HS is close to zero be-
cause of the differing interpretation of the measure. Because
of this it does not make sense to compare the mean of HS
with ETR or BTD measures. Surprisingly, the positive value
of 0.0281 indicates that firms have, on average, positive tax
preferences. The mean of all BTD measures is slightly above
zero, which implies that on average the BTD is positive and
thus the taxable income is below the book income. The re-
sults support the view that the Total BTD may be influenced
also by other factors than tax planning (i.e. it has the high-
est mean of all BTD, 0.0324). The Discretionary Total BTD is
lower (0.0232) which is in line with excluding earnings man-
agement as a driver of large BTD. Finally, the Discretionary
Permanent BTD controls for more drivers of BTD not associ-
ated with tax planning and thus yields the lowest average of
BTD measures (0.0071).
Looking at the standard deviation (Std. Dev.) of ETR
measures one can infer that all measures using either cash
taxes paid in the numerator and/or operating cash flow in
the denominator have a higher variability than those using
pre-tax income or total tax expense. This result is not sur-
prising since accrual accounting (evident in pre-tax income
and total tax expense) smoothens fluctuation in cash flows
over the years (Dechow (1994), p. 19). Cash taxes paid and
operating cash flow on the other hand should be subject to
a higher volatility. The volatility of BTD decreases from To-
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tal to Discretionary Total BTD and is lowest for Discretionary
Permanent BTD.
Graphically, the distributions of ETR and HS measures
are shown in Figure 1. Notably, the measures are distributed
around their means. Further there is a relatively high frac-
tion of ETR observations in the range [0, 0.1]. This is due
to the fact that for these observations the numerator often
takes very small values. It also becomes evident that higher
values of ETR (values in the range (0.5, 1]) are relatively
rare. Not surprisingly, the HS measure is centered on zero,
which is in line with the interpretation of the measure and
the mean close to zero (0.0281). The distribution also re-
veals that although the mean is positive, a large fraction of
HS is slightly negative, suggesting that a substantial fraction
of observations is identified as having negative tax prefer-
ences. The distributions of BTD measures in Figure 2 reveal
that those measures are centered on zero. Total BTD and
Discretionary Total BTD have quite similar distributional pat-
terns with slightly positive BTD. In line with a mean of 0.0071
and a small standard deviation of 0.0439, the Discretionary
Permanent BTD is clustered closely around zero. Overall, the
distributions of the single measures exhibit considerable vari-
ation.
All in all, the comparison of means, standard deviations,
and distributions has shown that there are differences be-
tween annual measures. Additionally, possible explanations
for those differences have been given. However, it cannot be
ruled out, that those differences are due to sampling error.
5.2.2. Development of Measures over Time
To examine whether the means of the annual measures
face changes over time, Figure 3 and 4 display the means of
those over the time horizon 1996-2015. In the figures it be-
comes evident that on average the ETR decreased over time
while the HS and BTD measures increased. These findings
are in line with prior research. Graham and Tucker (Graham
and Tucker (2006), pp. 564–565) find a decrease in Effective
Tax Rates for S&P 500 firms over the period of 1988-2004 and
reports a similar pattern for all publicly traded firms, while
Desai (2003) finds an increase in BTD during the 1990s. A
decrease in ETR corresponding with a simultaneous increase
in BTD suggests, that both measures could capture an in-
crease in tax avoidance (as argued in Desai (2003), p. 170
for BTD).
It becomes evident, that the differences between the
means as described above are constant over time. The order
of the means (from highest to lowest) remains the same for
the ETR measures (except for C F M1) and BTD. This sup-
ports the argumentation that there are differences between
the measures. However, all measures seem to follow the
same pattern over time, which suggests, that despite their
differences they might capture, at least to some point, similar
aspects of tax avoidance (alternatively the measures might
be driven by other economy wide powers).
5.2.3. Correlation between Annual Measures
Although summary statistics and frequency distributions
give a first insight about the properties and similarities of
the different measures, it is interesting to investigate how
closely related the measures are, given that despite differ-
ences in means, they seem to behave in some way similarly
over time. This can be examined using a correlation matrix.
The correlation matrix is based on the Bravais-Pearson cor-
relation coefficient, which can be used for metric data such
as the data at hand. The Bravais-Pearson correlation coeffi-
cient yields values from -1 to 1, where -1 indicates a perfect
negative linear relationship and 1 a perfect positive linear
relationship; 0 represents no linear relationship (Toutenburg
et al. (2009), pp. 130–137). The correlation matrix of the
annual measures is displayed in Table 2.
The correlation matrix shows that there is a high posi-
tive linear relationship between ETR measures ranging from
0.3953 between GAAP ETR and C F M2 to 0.7789 between
C F M1 and C F M2. This is not surprising since the measures
are based on the same rationale and use similar inputs. Also
not surprising is that measures with the same inputs in the
numerator or denominator such as C F M1 and C F M2 (both
using operating cash flow) or Cash and Current ETR (both
using pre-tax income) seem to be more highly correlated.
The correlation between ETR measures and the HS measure
is also positive, yet lower. This may be due to the differ-
ent interpretations of the measures. As one would expect,
the correlation coefficients between ETR and BTD are neg-
ative, suggesting that a low ETR is associated with positive
BTD. However, the correlation decreases when ETR measures
are compared with Discretionary Total BTD or Discretionary
Permanent BTD. The BTD measures are positively correlated
among one another (ranging from 0.1343 to 0.6507), which
should be due to the similarities of computation.
Overall, the correlation analysis suggests that ETR mea-
sures behave quite similarly. Also ETR and BTD are corre-
lated, meaning that those measures should measure similar
aspects of tax avoidance. BTD measures (especially Discre-
tionary Total and Permanent BTD) face a weaker correlation
among themselves, suggesting that those measures might be
able to proxy different aspects of tax avoidance. However,
since this analysis is only descriptive in nature, one cannot
rule out the possibility that those relationships are sample-
specific.
5.3. Comparison of Annual and Long-Run Measures
In a second step, several measures of long-run tax avoid-
ance (spanning time periods of five to ten years) are com-
pared with one another. These measures are then compared
to annual measures in order to investigate how closely re-
lated annual and long-run measures are and how good the
former are in predicting long-run tax aggressiveness.
5.3.1. Distributional Characteristics of Long-Run Measures
Looking at the means in Table 3 (and Table 1), Long-
Run Cash ETR seems to increase as the observation period
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Figure 1: Distribution of Annual ETR and HS
Figure 2: Distribution of BTD
increases (from annual to ten years 0.2124, 0.2415, 0.2456,
respectively). This suggests that it becomes more difficult for
firms to maintain a low Cash ETR over time. Conversely, the
HS measure decreases as the observation period increases
(from annual to ten years 0.0281, 0.0048, 0.0042, respec-
tively). So, according to the HS measure, tax preferences
decrease over time, meaning that the actual tax payments
converge to the hypothetical tax payments. Taken together,
both long-run measures seem to converge to a lower degree
of tax avoidance as the observation period increases, suggest-
ing that it is difficult to maintain tax benefits over long peri-
ods of time.
The standard deviation reveals, that the variation of the
measures decreases as the observation period increases (from
annual to ten years 0.1900, 0.1518, 0.1450, respectively, for
Cash ETR, and 0.0677, 0.0195, 0.0167, respectively, for HS),
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Figure 3: Development of ETR and HS Measures over Time
Figure 4: Development of BTD Measures over Time
which is in line with the theoretical argumentation.
Similarly, the distributions depicted in Figure 5 (and Fig-
ure 1) show that over time, the distributions tighten as the
observation period increases. For Cash ETR, the fractions of
observations close to zero and one decrease while more ob-
servations fall into the range of (0.3, 0.4] (near the statutory
tax rate of 0.35). The HS measure gets clustered even closer
around zero.
5.3.2. Correlation between Annual and Long-Run Measures
To compare annual and long-run measures, the Bravais-
Pearson correlation coefficients are displayed in Table 4.
The correlation coefficients between annual ETR and
long-run measures of tax avoidance are positive. This posi-
tive correlation with long-run measures is strongest for Cur-
rent and Cash ETR (between 0.5147 and 0.6664 for Current
ETR and between 0.4962 and 0.6793 for Cash ETR), The cor-
M. S. Gebhart / Junior Management Science 3 (2017) 43-60 55
Table 2: Correlation Matrix of Annual Measures
GAAP Current Cash C F M1 C F M2 HS Total Discr. Discr. Per-
ETR ETR ETR BTD Total BTD manent BTD
GAAP ETR 1.0000
Current ETR 0.5857 1.0000
Cash ETR 0.5135 0.7306 1.0000
C F M1 0.5830 0.4482 0.4015 1.0000
C F M2 0.3953 0.5636 0.7301 0.7789 1.0000
HS 0.3298 0.5216 0.7410 0.2169 0.5628 1.0000
Total BTD -0.3619 -0.6386 -0.4946 -0.2493 -0.3899 -0.5971 1.0000
Discr. Total BTD -0.3343 -0.5069 -0.4037 -0.2399 -0.3385 -0.4545 0.6507 1.0000
Discr. Permanent BTD -0.1845 -0.1094 -0.0836 -0.1213 -0.0718 -0.0800 0.1505 0.1343 1.0000
Table 3: Distributional Characteristics of Long-Run Measures
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
lr. Cash ETR5 682 0.2415 0.1518 0 0.9348
lr. Cash ETR10 354 0.2456 0.1450 0 0.8357
lr. HS5 911 0.0048 0.0195 -0.0262 0.1099
lr. HS10 470 0.0042 0.0167 -0.0275 0.0997
Table 4: Correlation between Annual and Long-Run Measures
lr. Cash lr. Cash lr. HS5 lr. HS10
ETR5 ETR10
GAAP ETR 0.3809 0.4051 0.3244 0.3397
Current ETR 0.6664 0.6243 0.5544 0.5147
Cash ETR 0.6793 0.6030 0.5751 0.4962
CFM1 0.4205 0.4559 0.3200 0.3507
CFM2 0.5793 0.5503 0.4859 0.4434
HS 0.5229 0.4467 0.5691 0.4629
Total BTD -0.4786 -0.4435 -0.5165 -0.4554
Discr. Total BTD -0.3696 -0.3374 -0.3859 -0.3271
Discr. Permanent BTD 0.0370 0.0324 0.0490 0.0380
Lr Cash ETR5 1.0000
Lr. Cash ETR10 0.8448 1.0000
Lr. HS5 0.8019 0.6894 1.0000
Lr. HS10 0.6776 0.8051 0.7765 1.0000
relation of C F M2 ranges between 0.4434 and 0.5793 while
those of GAAP ETR and C F M1 are lower, yet still positive.
The correlation is stronger between annual and long-run ETR
measures than between annual ETR and long-run HS. Also,
Annual HS is positively correlated with the long-run mea-
sures while the correlation between annual and long-run
measures of the same kind is higher than across measures.
It appears plausible that the correlation between annual and
long-run measures increases with higher similarity in in-
puts and computation. For all ETR measures except GAAP
ETR and C F M1 the correlation with the five-year measures
is higher than with the ten-year measures. Similarly, the
correlation between Annual HS and the long-run measures
decreases over time.
The Total and Discretionary Total BTD are negatively cor-
related to the proxies for long-run tax avoidance. Notably,
this negative correlation decreases as the observation period
increases. Further, the correlation for Discretionary Total
BTD (ranging from -0.3271 to -0.3696) is lower than for Total
BTD (ranging from -0.4554 to -0.5165). Surprisingly, the Dis-
cretionary Permanent BTD is positively correlated with the
long-run measures (ranging from 0.0324 to 0.0490). How-
ever, this correlation is close to zero suggesting no linear re-
lationship. Overall, the BTD seem to be higher (negatively)
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Figure 5: Distribution of Long-Run Measures
correlated with the Long-Run HS measure than with Long-
Run Cash ETR. As one would expect, the correlations be-
tween the five- and ten-year measure of the same kind are
very high (0.8448 between lr. Cash ETR5 and lr. Cash ETR10
and 0.7765 between lr. HS5 and lr. HS10). The correlation
between Long-Run Cash ETR and Long-Run HS is high for
both five- and ten-year measures. This suggests that both
kinds of long-run measures will detect similar aspects of long-
run tax avoidance.
Altogether, the correlation between most annual and
long-run measures is relatively high. Not surprisingly, an-
nual ETR (HS) measures are more highly correlated with
long-run ETR (HS) measures. In most cases the correlation
between BTD and Long-run HS is higher than between BTD
and Long-Run Cash ETR. The correlation between long-run
measures is very high.
5.3.3. Reliability of Annual Measures in Predicting Long-Run
Tax Avoidance
Although the correlation coefficients show the relation-
ship between the single measures, it does not become clear,
how reliable annual measures can predict long-run tax ag-
gressiveness. Therefore, an additional analysis is conducted.
The proxies based on annual numbers and over time are
sorted into two groups, “low” and “high” depending on the
values they take. For ETR measures, an observation is allo-
cated to the group “low” if the Effective Tax Rate is below
0.35 and “high” if the tax rate is above or equal to 0.35. BTD
measures are classified as “low” if BTD> 0 and “high” if BTD
≤ 0. The HS measure is defined as “high” if HS > 0 and
“low” if HS ≤ 0. Subsequently, the observations are counted
for which both the annual and long-run measures either take
“low” or “high” values, i.e. for which the annual measure
correctly identifies the firm to pay a low (high) amount of
corporate taxes according to the longrun measure; Table 5
column (A) displays the relative frequencies for which an-
nual measures identify the long-run tax behavior correctly.
As one can see, the reliability of annual measures in pre-
dicting long-run tax avoidance is not very high. GAAP ETR is
only able to identify 0.5854 of the observations correctly ac-
cording to Long-Run Cash ETR. The fractions for C F M1 and
C F M2 are slightly higher (0.6529, 0.6342 (0.6534, 0.6250)
for Long-Run Cash ETR (HS), respectively). Only Current
and Cash ETR exhibit a greater reliability with fractions of
approximately 0.67 to 0.68 for both long-run measures. The
Annual HS measure is able to identify 0.6822 of observations
correctly according to the Long-Run Cash ETR. According to
the Long-Run HS measure, the fraction of correctly identi-
fied observations increases to 0.6902. Total BTD are able to
identify 0.4512 (0.4776) of observations correctly according
to Long-Run Cash ETR10 (HS10). This fraction increases for
Discretionary Total BTD (0.4848, 0.5172 for Long-Run Cash
ETR10 and Long-Run HS10, respectively) and Discretionary
Permanent BTD (0.5616, 0.5888, respectively). Interestingly,
according the Long-Run HS10, the reliability of annual mea-
sures is in most cases higher than the Long-Run Cash ETR10
suggests. When looking separately at the correct identifica-
tion of “low tax paying firms” and “high tax paying firms” it
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Table 5: Reliability of Annual Measures in Predicting Long-Run Tax Avoidance
(A) (B)
lr. Cash lr. HS10 lr. Cash lr. HS10
ETR10 ETR10
GAAP ETR
low 0.7303 0.6814 0.5214 0.6674
high 0.5212 0.6150 0.7364 0.6366
total 0.5854 0.6354 0.6610 0.6474
Current ETR
low 0.7545 0.6790 0.6288 0.6871
high 0.6100 0.6937 0.7832 0.6384
total 0.6758 0.6870 0.7318 0.6546
Cash ETR
low 0.7393 0.6648 0.6089 0.6756
high 0.6229 0.7083 0.7750 0.6340
total 0.6804 0.6868 0.7192 0.6480
CFM1
low 0.7094 0.6370 0.5399 0.6080
high 0.5901 0.6716 0.7421 0.6013
total 0.6529 0.6534 0.6732 0.6036
CFM2
low 0.6681 0.5893 0.5311 0.5610
high 0.5901 0.6716 0.7458 0.5813
total 0.6342 0.6250 0.6684 0.5740
HS
low 0.7456 0.6713 0.5345 0.6864
high 0.6225 0.7080 0.7879 0.7000
total 0.6822 0.6902 0.6764 0.6940
Total BTD
low 0.5166 0.3928 0.2264 0.4485
high 0.4331 0.5010 0.5825 0.5193
total 0.4512 0.4776 0.4642 0.4958
Discr. Total BTD
low 0.5851 0.4858 0.2928 0.4978
high 0.4532 0.5271 0.6167 0.5433
total 0.4848 0.5172 0.5118 0.5286
Discr. Permanent BTD
low 0.6844 0.6016 0.4112 0.5942
high 0.5041 0.5828 0.6745 0.5918
total 0.5616 0.5888 0.5870 0.5926
becomes clear that the persistence of “low tax paying firms”
is higher looking at the Long-run Cash ETR10 measure, while
the reverse is the case according to the Long-Run HS10 mea-
sure.
These results may be distorted by economy-wide shocks
that could result in large losses for the firms on average in sin-
gle years. Thus all or at least a majority of the firms would ex-
hibit low tax payments in years around those shocks (due to
loss carry backs and loss carry forwards) not associated with
tax avoidance. In those years, comparing ETR with the statu-
tory tax rate and HS and BTD with zero to decide about the
degree of tax avoidance would lead to wrong inferences. To
test whether the results in Table 5, column (A) are driven by
such economy-wide shocks, column (B) compares the mea-
sures of a year with the corresponding median of all firms in
that year.
As one can see, the overall reliability of annual measures
in predicting long-run tax avoidance increases in most cases
when medians instead of fixed values are used in allocating
observations (this is true for both measures). Interestingly,
the persistence of observations being identified as “low” de-
creases while the reverse is the case for “high” observations.
Thus, using fixed values for allocation purposes may be mis-
leading.
Overall, the reliability of annual measures in depicting
long-run tax avoidance is not very high. Only looking at one
year seems not to provide enough information to make solid
conclusions about the tax aggressiveness across time since a
substantial fraction of observations would be incorrectly clas-
sified as “high” or “low”. Furthermore, the decisions about
the tax aggressiveness solely made on fixed limits may be
misleading in single years.
6. Conclusion
The aim of this bachelor thesis is to give an overview of
and analyze the different measures of tax avoidance used
in the literature and to answer the question of how closely
related these measures are among one another. In the em-
pirical tax research there are several proxies for tax avoid-
ance, most of which rely on financial accounting data. Most
prevalent are measures based on ETR and BTD. Besides these
two, measures from Henry and Sansing (2014), Tax Shelter
Scores, and the Unrecognized Tax Benefits are used to proxy
for tax avoidance. All measures differ with respect to the un-
derlying rationale of measuring tax avoidance and the inputs
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used. This leads to the question of how closely related the
measures are, which is tested empirically.
The descriptive results suggest that, although there are
differences between the single measures and those differ-
ences persist over time, especially annual proxies exhibit
considerable correlation. This correlation gets stronger as
the similarity in computation and inputs increases and is
strongest between measures of the same kind. The results
suggest that the different measures may in fact be closely re-
lated. A comparison between annual and long-run measures
implies that the reliability of annual measures in depicting
long-run tax avoidance seems not sufficiently high. Since the
samples used in the empirical investigation may be subject
to a substantial truncation bias due to stringent assumptions,
the results may only be sample-specific.
In conclusion it should be mentioned that the right choice
for a measure of corporate tax avoidance heavily depends
on the data availability and aims of the research question at
hand. Since some measures require more inputs than oth-
ers and may exclude/include specific forms of tax avoidance,
which others do not, specific measures may be more suitable
than others. Also a common approach of researchers if data
availability is no issue is to use several different proxies si-
multaneously to investigate, how their results are influenced
by the proxies for tax avoidance.
Besides the existing literature, the need for research
about (measuring) corporate tax avoidance still remains.
First, a universally accepted definition of tax avoidance is
still missing, which prevents the creation of more power-
ful measures. Although one single sharp definition may
be unrealistic, Hanlon and Heitzman (Hanlon and Heitz-
man (2010), p. 137) argue that continued research may
increase the probability of an accepted definition. Second,
since all existing measures exhibit limitations, the search for
new forms of measuring tax avoidance should be continued.
Third, further research should analyze the relationships be-
tween measures beyond purely descriptive statistics to be
able to make universal statements. Among others, these are
issues that need to be addressed in the future.
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